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Using a simple empirical strategy, we decode the information in insider trades.  Exploiting the fact
that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable “routine”
insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. Stripping away these routine trades, which
comprise over half the entire universe of insider trades, leaves a set of information-rich “opportunistic”
trades that contains all the predictive power in the insider trading universe. A portfolio strategy that
focuses solely on opportunistic insider trades yields value-weight abnormal returns of 82 basis points
per month, while the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. Further,
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Price setters and regulators share a common challenge: how to sift through the 
multitude of information events that bombard securities markets each day, and 
determine which events contain viable information, and which do not.  Price 
setters in these markets must ascertain which of these events, and what parts of 
their contents, have insight into firm value.  Regulators, on the other hand, must 
work to ensure that information flow in the capital markets is "timely, 
comprehensive and accurate."
1   
  A class of information events that is especially difficult to decipher is the 
trading activity of corporate insiders.  Insiders are a unique class of traders as 
they, by definition, have favored access to private information about the given 
firm.  Because of this preferential access, insiders are subject to increased scrutiny, 
regulation, and restrictions regarding their trading activities.     
  Another unique aspect of insiders is that they often receive a large 
proportion of their stakes in firms through non-market transactions (e.g. stock 
grants).  Through initial ownership, stock grants, and other market transactions, 
insiders’ firm stockholdings are often a non-trivial percentage of their wealth.   
Thus personal liquidity and diversification motives, in addition to signaling and 
regulatory issues, will affect the timing and nature of insider trades, making it 
more difficult for price setters to interpret any given insider trade as informative or 
not.   
  The detection of illegal insider trading, meanwhile, presents an even higher 
hurdle: the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must demonstrate 
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that a person "trades a security while in possession of material nonpublic 
information in violation of a duty to withhold the information or refrain from 
trading."
2  The rash of high-profile insider trading cases in recent years, notably 
the government’s investigation into the Galleon Group in late 2009--the largest 
hedge fund insider trading case in U.S. history--indicates that the SEC continues 
to expend substantial resources trying to address this difficult problem.     
  In this paper we provide a new framework for thinking about detection and 
information flow in the capital markets.  Using a simple, novel approach, we 
decode the information in insider trades, showing that there is predictable, 
identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms.  
Classifying trades in this way allows us to strip away these uninformative signals, 
leaving information-rich “opportunistic” trades that contain all of the predictive 
power for future firm news, events, and returns.  
  Our analysis rests on the simple idea that insiders, while possessing private 
information, trade for many reasons. For example, routine sells by insiders are 
commonplace in the market, and can be driven by diversification or liquidity 
reasons, with the insider wanting to signal that he is not trading on information 
about the firm (e.g., Bill Gates).  Routine buys, on the other hand, may occur 
after an insider receives a bonus; since bonuses are often paid out in the same 
month each year, and since insiders often receive discount plans on their company 
stock (and hence are more likely to buy the stock), insider buying in the same 
calendar month is common and often uninformative.  Thus if one can classify these 
                                                 
2 From the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website: 
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trades ex-ante that are routine trades (and so less informative), one can better 
identify the true information that insiders contain and thus develop a richer 
understanding of firm-level asset prices.             
  To better understand our approach, consider the following example from our 
sample.
3  Moonburst is a large, publicly traded firm, which in 1994 operated in 
over 40 states, and employed more than 30,000 people.  The firm had a number of 
insiders.  In particular, two of these insiders were actively trading, but in much 
different ways.  In Figure 1, we illustrate what the trades of both of these insiders 
looked like from January 1994 to June 1996.  The first insider (the routine trader), 
traded consistently over the time period, routinely trading in each and every 
month.  The second insider (the opportunistic trader), who also happens to be the 
CFO of Moonburst, traded much differently.  Her trades came at very selective 
times, as can be seen in Figure 1.   
  Not only do the trades of the opportunistic trader appear to contain much 
more information for prices, they also have predictive ability over future news.   
For instance, following the June 1996 trade of the opportunistic trader, there were 
15 news announcements in the subsequent month.  These news articles highlighted 
the important company announcement that it would be delaying its earnings 
announcement for the given quarter, and speculated as to why.  This large number 
of news was accompanied with a -10.0% return in the month.  These patterns 
regarding the predictability of news announcements are true throughout the lives 
of these Moonburst routine and opportunistic traders.  In sum, the trades of the 
opportunistic trader predict over twice as many news announcements as the trades 
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of routine traders.  What is important to note here is that both the opportunistic 
and routine traders were trading in their respective manners throughout their 
entire trading histories, so one could predictably identify these traders as either 
opportunistic or routine traders before the period we have shown here.  We exploit 
this ability to predictably classify insiders into these two classes of traders 
throughout the paper.    
  Had one taken the naïve strategy of replicating all insider trades, one would 
have sold short Moonburst each month over this two and a half year period and 
made an average monthly return of -2.5% (as the monthly return was +2.5%).  If, 
on the other hand, one were to use the fact that different insider behavior conveys 
different information, in a potentially predictable way, one could have sold short in 
only the months when the opportunistic insider sold, and made an average of 
10.9% during these trading months (or roughly 70 bp per month over the full two 
and a half years). 
In this paper we demonstrate that the above example of Moonburst 
represents a much more systematic pattern across the entire universe of corporate 
insiders and publicly traded firms.  We are able to systematically and predictably 
identify insiders as either opportunistic or routine traders throughout our sample 
period (1986-2007).  Further, an attractive feature of our approach is that our 
classification scheme essentially divides the insider trading universe in half, with 
roughly 45% of all trades originating from opportunistic traders, and 55% of all 
trades originating from routine traders.  We show that the abnormal returns 
associated with routine traders are essentially zero, indicating that our approach is 
able to weed out more than half the universe of insider trades, and specifically the Decoding Inside Information — Page 5 
 
half that has no predictive power for future returns or firm news.  Meanwhile, the 
half that remains contains all the predictive power in the insider trading universe. 
   Our empirical strategy for identifying routine traders is simple.  For each 
insider, we analyze her past trading history, and look for consistent patterns in the 
timing of trades.  Specifically, we define a routine trader as an insider who placed a 
trade in the same calendar month for at least a certain number of years in the 
past.  We then define opportunistic traders as everyone else, i.e. those insiders for 
whom we cannot detect an obvious discernible pattern in the past timing of their 
trades.  We thus designate all insiders as either routine traders or opportunistic 
traders at the beginning of each calendar year, based on their past history of 
trades, and then look to see how they trade from that point onwards.   
  We show that focusing only on the trades of opportunistic traders allows us 
to weed out uninformative signals and identify a set of information-rich trades that 
are powerful predictors of future firm returns, news, and events.  For example, a 
long-short portfolio that exploits solely the trades of opportunistic traders 
(opportunistic buys minus opportunistic sells) earns value-weight abnormal returns 
of 82 basis points per month (9.8 percent annualized, t=2.15), and equal-weight 
abnormal returns of 180 basis points per month (21.6 percent annualized, t=6.07).  
Meanwhile, a portfolio that mimics the behavior of routine traders (routine buys 
minus routine sells) earns value-weight returns of -20 basis points per month (t=-
0.57), and equal-weight returns of only 43 basis points per month (t=1.73).  
Finally, we demonstrate that an alternate approach for identifying routine 
trading–focusing on trade-level patterns within a given insider, and thus allowing 
a given insider to be both routine and opportunistic at different times–yields Decoding Inside Information — Page 6 
 
similar inferences regarding the predictive power of routine versus opportunistic 
trades.    
    Importantly, we show that over half of the improvement in predictive power 
gained by focusing on opportunistic trades comes from the superior performance of 
opportunistic sells relative to routine sells; this is in contrast to much of the 
literature (see Jeng et al. (2003) for a discussion), which generally finds weak 
evidence on the profitability of insider sales.  Further, we find that the returns to 
these opportunistic trades continue to rise for roughly six months following the 
opportunistic trading month, and then level off, exhibiting no future reversal.   
Thus, it appears that the information being conveyed through the trades of 
opportunistic insiders has lasting implications for firm values.      
We also examine if the number of trades of a given type (i.e., the strength 
of the signal) conveys incremental information above and beyond the mere 
knowledge that a particular type of trade took place.  We find that this is the case: 
the abnormal future returns of a firm are significantly higher the more 
opportunistic buys occur, and significantly lower the more opportunistic sells 
occur.  In terms of magnitude, a one-standard deviation increase in the number of 
opportunistic buys predicts an increased abnormal return of 35 basis points per 
month in the following month (t=4.56), while a one-standard deviation increase in 
the number of opportunistic sells results in a 29 basis point lower abnormal return 
(t=4.97).  In contrast, a similar move in the number of routine trades (both buys 
and sells) at a firm has statistically insignificant and near zero predictive power for 
future returns.       
  Next we explore the mechanism at work behind our findings by analyzing Decoding Inside Information — Page 7 
 
firm-level news and events, as well as opportunistic trading after SEC news 
releases regarding illegal insider trading.  If opportunistic trades truly do contain 
important information for the future of the firm, we might expect to see this 
revealed in future news and events related to the firm.  We find that the trades of 
opportunistic insiders show significant predictive power for future news about the 
firm, while trades by routine insiders do not.  Meanwhile, consistent with the idea 
that opportunistic traders dampen their trading activity when the potential costs 
of illegal insider trading increase, we find that the fraction of traders who are 
opportunistic in a given month is negatively related to the number of recent news 
releases by the SEC regarding illegal insider trading cases.  Further, we examine 
which types of opportunistic insiders execute trades before information events, and 
find evidence that local insiders, who we might expect to be more informed ex-
ante, have opportunistic trades that are especially informative for future 
information events.   
Lastly, we perform a variety of robustness checks to verify that our results 
are not concentrated in certain types of stocks, or at certain specific times.  We 
show that our main result that opportunistic trades are more informative than 
routine trades holds for both large stocks and small stocks, both heavily-traded 
stocks and lightly-traded stocks, and both inside and outside explicit “blackout” 
periods.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I of the paper 
provides a brief background and literature review, while Section II describes our 
data on insider transactions, as well as the other data we use in the paper.  Section 
III provides the main results on the performance of opportunistic traders versus Decoding Inside Information — Page 8 
 
routine traders. Section IV explores the mechanism behind the predictive power of 
opportunistic trades, and Section V provides robustness checks.  Section VI 
concludes.  
  
I.  The setting 
The trades of corporate insiders are among the most widely scrutinized 
activities in the stock market each day.  Regulators, investment managers, media 
members, and academics continually parse these trades for signs of illicit behavior, 
and for signals about a company’s future prospects.  Not surprisingly, the 
widespread interest in insider trading has spawned a large empirical literature, 
most of which examines the cross-sectional return forecasting ability of insider 
trades aggregated at the firm level.  By contrast, our focus is on the individual 
insiders themselves and their past trading records, and as such our approach tries 
to isolate predictable variation in the informativeness of insider trades by 
identifying which insiders are likely to be trading on information and which are 
not. 
Numerous papers study the cross-sectional variation of future stock returns 
as a function of past insider-trading activity.  Many of these articles (see, for 
example, Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986, 1998), Rozeff 
and Zaman (1988), Lin and Howe (1990), Bettis, Vickery, and Vickery (1997) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001)) focus on the abnormal returns to firms in relation to 
various metrics of firm-level insider trading frequency over well-defined periods.   
Seyhun (1998) summarizes this evidence and reports that several different trading Decoding Inside Information — Page 9 
 
rules lead to profits.
4  Similarly, Jeng et al. (2003) take a performance-evaluation 
perspective and find that insider purchases earn abnormal returns of more than 6% 
per year, while insider sales do not earn significant abnormal returns.   
Also relevant to our findings are a series of papers, many in the accounting 
literature, that examine insider trading around/before various types of firm events.  
For example, with respect to future earnings news, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) 
show that insider trades reflect both contrarian beliefs and superior information 
about future cash flow realizations, while Ke, Huddard and Petroni (2003) 
demonstrate that insiders trade before significant accounting disclosures as much 
as two years prior to the disclosure.
5  In related work, Kahle (2000) finds that the 
long-run performance after seasoned equity offerings is significantly related to 
measures of insider trading, while Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2001) provide 
evidence consistent with insiders exploiting windows of opportunity by trying to 
issue overvalued equity.  Finally, Jagolinzer (2009) focuses on a small sample of 
insiders who publicly disclose 10b5-1 plans (these plans came into existence in late 
2000 and permit an insider to pre-specify her buys and sells on a given firm); he 
finds that insiders initiate sales plans before bad news and terminate sales plans 
before good performance.
6  However, Sen (2008) examines these same plans and 
finds no significant difference in stock price performance surrounding the initiation 
                                                 
4 A related strand of the literature (see, for example, Seyhun (1988, 1992, 1998) and Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001), among others) studies insiders’ ability to forecast the time series of aggregate stock 
returns, a subject we do not explore in this paper.  See also Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) for 
cross-country evidence on insider trading laws and stock price informativeness.    
5 See also Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006), and Elliott, Morse, and Richardson (1984) for 
other evidence of insiders trading around news events. 
6 Our evidence pre-dates the existence of these plans: e.g., in unreported results we find very similar 
differential performance of opportunistic versus routine trades before 2000, suggesting that our 
results are not driven by trades in these plans.  Decoding Inside Information — Page 10 
 
or termination of the plans.     
 
II.  Data 
  The data in this study are collected from several sources. Our primary data 
on insider trades are drawn from the Thomson Reuters insider filings database.  
Section 16a of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires that open-market 
trades by corporate insiders be reported to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) within 10 days after the end of month in which they took 
place.
7  Corporate insiders include officers with decision-making authority over the 
operations of the firm, all board members, and beneficial owners of more than 10% 
of a company’s stock.  These reports, filed on the SEC’s Form 4, contain 
information about each insider transaction and about each insider’s relationship to 
the firm.
8 Our data are drawn from these Form 4 filings for the period January, 
1986 to December, 2007.  Our analysis focuses on open-market purchases and sales 
by insiders, and hence we exclude options exercises and private transactions.  We 
merge our insider transaction data with firm-level data from CRSP/Compustat, 
including monthly stock returns, market capitalization figures, and book-to-market 
ratios.     
  For our tests involving insider trades before news announcements, we 
extract headline news data from various newswires using the Factiva web interface. 
First, we use the CRSP monthly stock name file to identify all company names of 
CRSP firms between 1989 and 2007. We then select all the Dow Jones Newswires, 
                                                 
7 This 10-day deadline was later changed to a 2-day deadline in 2002.  The median delay between 
trade date and report date over our entire 22 year sample is 3 days. 
8 See Jeng et al. (2003) for details on data issues with Form 4. Decoding Inside Information — Page 11 
 
as well as other newswires, that are available on Factiva.  For each stock on the 
CRSP tape we extract all the news events where the firm’s name (or any of the 
names if multiple names exist for a given stock) is mentioned in either the headline 
or in the lead paragraph. We restrict the search to news items in English 
containing at least 5 words. We exclude republished news and recurring pricing or 
market data. For every news item we retain the headline, the release date, the 
release time, the word count and the data source. The final sample includes 
2,956,862 headlines for 12,455 stocks between the years 1989 to 2000.  The reason 
we include news data only up to 2000 is that Factiva had a structural break in 
their indexing system in that year, and hence from 2000 onwards indexed many 
fewer firms in the news articles in its data.   
  Table I presents summary statistics for our sample.  This table presents an 
overview of the Thomson Reuters insiders database, as well as the subset of the 
data for which we can define the “routine” and “opportunistic” traders that 
feature in our analysis.  As noted earlier, routine trades are made for a variety of 
reasons.  For example, routine sells by insiders are often driven by diversification 
or liquidity reasons, with the insider wanting to signal that he is not trading on 
information about the firm (e.g., Bill Gates).  Routine buys, on the other hand, 
may occur after an insider receives a bonus; since bonuses are generally paid out in 
the same month each year, and since insiders often receive discount plans on their 
company stock (and hence are more likely to buy the stock), insider buying in the 
same calendar month is common and often uninformative.       
  We require an insider to make at least one trade in each of the three 
preceding years in order to define her as either an opportunistic or a routine Decoding Inside Information — Page 12 
 
trader.  Specifically, we define a routine trader as an insider who placed a trade in 
the same calendar month for at least three consecutive years.
9  We then define 
opportunistic traders as everyone else, i.e. those insiders for whom we cannot 
detect an obvious discernible pattern in the past timing of their trades.  We thus 
designate all insiders as either routine traders or opportunistic traders at the 
beginning of each calendar year, based on their past history of trades, and then 
look to see how they trade from that point onwards.  All subsequent trades that 
are made after we classify each insider as either routine or opportunistic are then 
placed into one of two buckets: a) “routine trades” (i.e., all trades made by routine 
traders), and b) “opportunistic trades” (i.e., all trades made by opportunistic 
traders).   
  Note that this simple algorithm for identifying routine buying or selling by 
insiders is clearly a noisy proxy for actual routine trading; our strategy will not 
perfectly and correctly classify each and every insider trade.  But the essence of 
our approach is that on average, trades made for information reasons are less likely 
to be regular in their timing, and trades made for liquidity and diversification 
reasons are more likely to be regular in their timing.   We have experimented with 
more refined measures (with similar and often stronger results),
10 but these simple 
measures are sufficient to illustrate our main point.   Also, as noted above, if we 
alter our classification scheme in order to exploit trade-level patterns within a 
given insider--and thus allow a given insider to be both routine and opportunistic 
                                                 
9 We have experimented with different back-windows (one, two, three, four, and five years) of past 
trading in the same calendar month.  We find similar results in both magnitude and significance for 
all windows. We show the results from the mid-point of these trading back-windows (i.e., three 
years of past trading) throughout the paper. 
10 For instance, we have tried a more stringent definition of routine based on both identical past 
calendar month and identical past trade size, and again find similar results. Decoding Inside Information — Page 13 
 
at different times--we again find similar results on the relative predictive power of 
routine versus opportunistic trades; these results are described in Section III.     
  Table I indicates that by implementing our routine trade identification 
assumptions (e.g., requiring three years of past insider transactions), our final 
sample is about one-third the size of the entire sample of insider transactions.  
Panel A shows that our sample is tilted towards bigger stocks, and slightly towards 
growth stocks (i.e., lower book-to-market ratios).  We can also see this in Figure 2.  
Specifically, from Figure 2, our insider sample has fewer micro-cap stocks (smallest 
decile) and roughly twice the percentage of largest decile stocks as compared to the 
CRSP universe.  Panel B of Table I shows that the insiders we include in our 
sample have a somewhat higher average number of trades (4.8 buys to 2.4, and 8.2 
sells to 4.1) relative to all insiders.
11   
  We have verified that our sample is representative of the larger universe of 
all insider trades in terms of the percentage of insider buys and sells (24% buys in 
the entire sample, 25% in our sample) and in terms of the overall return 
predictability of insider buys and insider sells.  For example, the difference in 
profitability of a value-weight long-short portfolio that goes long insider buys and 
short insider sells, in our sample versus the overall sample, is only 21 basis points 
per month and is statistically insignificant (t=0.83).  Table A1 in the Appendix 
presents further evidence on the profitability of insider trades, by splitting the 
insider universe into young versus old companies (where the cutoff for young 
companies is 3 years since the IPO).  Table A1 shows that there is no statistical 
                                                 
11 Note that the average number of trades only includes trades made after we classify an insider as 
opportunistic or routine. All insiders in our sample have at least three more years worth of trades 
that we use to classify insiders, but do not use in our subsequent tests. Decoding Inside Information — Page 14 
 
difference in the profitability of insider trades in young versus old companies; thus 
we are not imposing any bias in our sample by focusing more often on insider 
trades made in large companies.
12   
  We classify roughly 64% of insider purchases and 52% of insider sales as 
routine trades; hence 36% of insider purchases and 48% of insider sales are 
classified as opportunistic trades.  Overall, trades made by routine traders 
comprise 55% of the total sample, while trades made by opportunistic traders 
represent 45% of the total sample.  This roughly 50/50 split in the data, coupled 
with our subsequent results showing that all the predictive power (in terms of 
future firm returns and news) is concentrated among the opportunistic trades, 
suggests that our identification procedure is able to weed out a set of 
uninformative signals that makes up more than half the universe of insider trades. 
Table II presents correlation coefficients for the main variables that feature in 
our analysis.  The number of insider sells, and particularly routine sells, is higher 
for larger firms and growth firms, while the number of insider buys, and 
particularly opportunistic buys, is higher for smaller firms and value firms.   
Consistent with the past literature, insiders are contrarian, buying after low past 
returns (measured over the prior 12 months) and selling after high past returns.   
  
     
III. Results: Performance of Opportunistic Trades versus Routine Trades 
In this section we examine the future stock return predictability of insider 
                                                 
12 We have also verified (in Table A2 in the Appendix) that there is no statistical difference in the 
profitability of "young" versus "old" insiders (where youth is measured by years of trading history 
for a given insider--"old" insiders are those with more than 3 years of trading history). Decoding Inside Information — Page 15 
 
transactions.  The goal of our approach is to identify, out of the tens of thousands 
of insider trades made each year, which trades are truly informative.  To do so we 
implement our routine trade classification, and then analyze the stock return 
performance of routine trades versus opportunistic trades.   
Our first tests employ regressions of one-month-ahead stock returns on 
indicators for routine and opportunistic trades.  We run pooled regressions with 
standard errors clustered at the firm level; we also include month fixed effects 
where indicated.  In addition, we include controls for well-known determinants of 
stock returns, such as size (log of market capitalization), (log) book-to-market 
ratio, one-month lagged returns, and cumulative past returns from month t-12 to 
t-2.   
Table III presents these regression results.  Columns 3 and 6 illustrate the 
main result of the paper: both opportunistic buys and opportunistic sells are strong 
predictors of future returns, while routine buys and sells are not.  For example, the 
coefficient on opportunistic buys in column 3 indicates that opportunistic buys 
yield an incremental 90 basis points (t=4.64) in the following month relative to all 
insider trades.  Meanwhile, routine buys yield only 14 additional basis points 
(t=0.81).  The difference in the coefficients on opportunistic buys and routine buys 
(=76 basis points) is statistically significant (F-test=10.07, p-value=0.002).
13  The 
results for sells are similar: Column 6 shows that opportunistic sells earn an 
additional -78 basis points (t=5.67), while routine sells earn +4 additional basis 
points (t=0.24).  Again, this difference between opportunistic sells and routine sells 
                                                 
13 The test of equality of routine and opportunistic coefficients is based on the point estimates and 
the robust covariance matrix of the estimates (clustered at the firm level). Decoding Inside Information — Page 16 
 
is large (=-82 basis points) and statistically significant (F-test=29.30, p-
value=0.000).    
Columns 7-9 of Table III present similar results, but with all four dummy 
variables (Opportunistic Buy,  Routine Buy,  Opportunistic Sell,  Routine Sell) 
included in the same regression.  Consistent with the results in Columns 1-6, these 
tests indicate that opportunistic trades are informative for future returns, while 
routine trades are not.  In Column 9, the difference in coefficients between 
opportunistic buys and routine buys is 77 basis points (F-tests=10.32, p-
value=0.001), and the difference in coefficients between opportunistic sells and 
routine sells is 81 basis points (F-test=28.87, p-value=0.000).   
Overall, the combined differences in the coefficients between opportunistic 
trades and routine trades in Table III translate into an increase of 158 basis points 
per month in the predictive ability of opportunistic trades relative to routine 
trades.
14  Additionally, our results demonstrate that over half the improvement in 
predictive power gained by focusing on opportunistic trades comes from the 
superior performance of opportunistic sells relative to routine sells; as noted earlier, 
this is in contrast to much of the literature (see Jeng et al. (2003) for a discussion), 
which often struggles to find evidence that insider sales predict lower future 
returns.    
 We have also experimented with an alternate, trade-level measure of 
"routine" and "opportunistic," rather than the insider-level measure used so far.  
This measure allows a given trader to have both routine and opportunistic trades; 
e.g., a given trader may be dubbed routine after having three straight January 
                                                 
14 From column 9, the difference is 158 bp [=(57-(-20)-(-67-14)]. Decoding Inside Information — Page 17 
 
trades, but in this alternate setup we only dub his subsequent January trades as 
routine trades, and categorize his trades in all other months as opportunistic.  And 
also, an opportunistic trader can have routine trades if he establishes a routine in 
any given calendar month.  In Appendix Table A3, Column 3 shows that the 
spread between opportunistic and routine buys using this trade-level measure 
(analog of Column 3 in Table III) is again large and significant (=94 basis points, 
F-test=8.39, p-value=0.0038), while Column 6 indicates that the spread between 
opportunistic and routine sells (analog of Column 6 in Table III) is also again large 
and significant (=94 basis points, F-test=15.99, p-value=0.0001).  These results 
demonstrate that our identification of informed insider trading is robust to slight 
changes in the classification procedure.     
  Next we analyze the returns of portfolios formed according to our routine 
trade classification scheme.  These provide a further test of the predictive ability of 
opportunistic versus routine trades.  To construct our portfolios, we identify 
opportunistic and routine trades each month, and then form opportunistic buy, 
opportunistic sell, routine buy, and routine sell portfolios containing these stocks.  
We then hold these stocks over the month following these insider trades; at the 
end of the month, we rebalance the portfolios based on new insider trades.   
Although the official SEC regulation was a requirement to report by the tenth day 
of the following month (which was then changed to 2 days after the trade date in 
2002), nearly all of the trades in our sample were reported to the SEC within a few 
days of the trade (median of 3 days over the entire sample), so we are confident Decoding Inside Information — Page 18 
 
they were available at portfolio formation here.
15  We compute both equal- and 
value-weight portfolios, and report the results in Table IV.   
  Table IV reports raw portfolio returns, as well as risk-adjusted portfolio 
returns (alphas) for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model, and the five-factor model including a liquidity factor, as 
well as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns.
16  Table IV shows that a portfolio 
strategy that focuses solely on the trades made by opportunistic traders earns large 
and significant returns, while a strategy that follows the trades of routine traders 
does not.  For example, the equal-weight portfolio that goes long opportunistic 
buys and short opportunistic sells earns a five-factor alpha of 180 basis points per 
month (t=6.07), or over 21.6% per year, while the portfolio that goes long routine 
buys and short routine sells earns a only marginally significant 43 basis points per 
month (t=1.73).   
  The bottom half of Table IV reveals a similar pattern for value-weight 
returns.  While the spread between routine buys and routine sells is actually 
negative when using value-weight returns, the spread in five-factor alphas between 
opportunistic buys and opportunistic sells is a positive and significant 82 basis 
                                                 
15 Given that the actual required reporting date for insiders is the 10th of the following month, in 
the Appendix Table A4 we re-run all the results from Table III, but this time using returns from 
the 11th day of day 1+1 to the 10th day of month t+2 in our tests (rather than from the 1st day of 
month t+1 to the last day of month t+1), and the results are virtually identical to those in Table 
III, meaning that our results are not sensitive to the timing convention we employ here; this finding 
also demonstrates that our results are fully tradable in real-time. 
16 Daniel and Titman (1997, 1998) suggest that characteristics can be better predictors of future 
returns than factor loadings.  Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), we 
subtract from each stock return the return on a portfolio of firms matched on market equity, 
market-book, and prior one-year return quintiles (a total of 125 matching portfolios). These 125 
portfolios are reformed every month based on the market equity, M/B ratio, and prior year return 
from the previous month. The portfolios are equal weighted and the quintiles are defined with 
respect to the entire CRSP universe in that month.  We term these abnormal returns DGTW 
characteristic-adjusted returns. Decoding Inside Information — Page 19 
 
points per month (t=2.15), or 9.8% per year.  Thus our predictability evidence is 
not limited to smaller firms, as in some prior studies that use insider trading data 
(see Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for a discussion).  Further, these results again 
demonstrate that all of the return predictability in the insider universe is 
concentrated within the trades of opportunistic traders.   
  In Figure 3 we plot event-time returns based on the portfolios out to twelve 
months, to illustrate the longer-term performance of opportunistic trades relative 
to routine trades.  Figure 3 indicates that the twelve-month event-time return on a 
value-weight four-leg spread portfolio (=[Opportunistic Buy-Opportunistic Sells]-
[Routine Buys-Routine Sells]) is roughly 4%; for the equal-weight four-leg spread 
portfolio, the twelve-month event-time return is roughly 8%.  In both cases, 
returns continue to rise for the first six months, and then level off, exhibiting no 
future reversal.  This suggests that the information being conveyed through the 
trades of opportunistic insiders has a lasting impact on firm value.      
  Taken as a whole, the findings in Table IV and Figure 3 corroborate our 
earlier regression results, and provide economically and statistically significant 
evidence that insider trades by opportunistic traders are much more informative 
than insider trades by routine traders.   
Next we investigate the impact of trade clustering on the relative performance 
of opportunistic trades and routine trades, under the hypothesis that the number 
of a given type of trade (i.e., the strength of the signal) may convey incremental 
information above and beyond the mere knowledge that a particular type of trade 
took place.  Specifically, instead of using a simple indicator variable on the right-
hand side of our regressions to identify the execution of any routine or Decoding Inside Information — Page 20 
 
opportunistic trades, we now use the actual number of each type of trade as our 
independent variable and run the same predictive regressions as before.   
Table V demonstrates that the (natural log of the) number of opportunistic 
buys is strongly positively related to future returns.  To get an idea of the 
magnitude of this effect, the coefficient estimate in Column 3 (=0.66, t=4.56) 
implies that a one-standard deviation increase in the log number of opportunistic 
buys (=0.54) per month translates to higher future returns of 35 basis points per 
month.  Meanwhile, the number of routine buys in a given trading month is 
unrelated to future returns, suggesting that insider buying intensity is a poor 
predictor of returns when those trades are of the routine variety.  Columns 4-6 
reveal an analogous result for opportunistic sells.  The coefficient in Column 6 (=-
0.31, t=4.97) implies that a one-standard deviation increase in the log number of 
opportunistic sells (=0.93) translates to a decrease in future returns of 29 basis 
points per month.  By contrast, the number of routine sells is uninformative for 
future returns.  And again when we include all of the routine and opportunistic 
variables together in a single regression (in Columns 7-9), the results are the 
same.
17     
Collectively our results in Tables III-V indicate that opportunistic trades, and 
the intensity of these trades, are informative for future returns, while routine 
trades are not.  These findings suggest that the ability to predictably classify 
insiders into either routine or opportunistic traders, using our simple empirical 
                                                 
17 Note that we have also run all tests in Tables III and V using Fama-MacBeth regressions, as well 
as pooled regressions with month and firm fixed effects, and the results are very similar.  For 
instance, the analog of the full specification in Table V, Column 9 using a Fama-MacBeth 
estimation gives buy and sell coefficients of 0.70 (t=3.72) and -0.40 (t=-2.86), and  using month 
and firm fixed effects gives coefficients of 0.56 (t=2.46) and -0.21 (t=2.23). Decoding Inside Information — Page 21 
 
strategy, allows one to focus in on the half of the insider universe that contains all 
the informative trades.   
  
IV. Mechanism 
In this section we examine information events and the timing of insider 
transactions.  Our goal is to explore the mechanism behind the large return 
predictability that we observe following opportunistic trades.   
We start by examining whether opportunistic trades are more likely than 
routine trades to precede important information events for the firm.  To do so, we 
run panel regressions of firm-level information events (available from 1989-2000) on 
the number of opportunistic trades and the number of routine trades.  The 
information events we examine are: headline news events about the firm, sell-side 
analyst research releases about the firm (i.e., annual and quarterly earnings 
forecast revisions, as well as buy/sell recommendation changes), and important 
management disclosures about the firm (SEO announcements and merger 
announcements).
18  We use the number of firm-level information events in a given 
category in a given month as our left-hand side variable, and control for the 
general level of news about the firm on the right-hand side (using, for example, the 
number of information events last month, and the average number of information 
events over the prior six months).  As in Tables III and V, we also control for firm-
level measures of size, book-to-market, and past returns. 
Table VI shows that opportunistic trades are predictive of future information 
                                                 
18 We exclude other firm events such as earnings announcements and dividend announcements that 
are often pre-scheduled far in advance and subject to explicit insider trading blackout periods. Decoding Inside Information — Page 22 
 
events at the insider’s firm, while routine trades are not.  This result holds across 
all information events, holds for a variety of sub-categories, and holds whether or 
not we control for the general level of news about a firm.  For example, in Column 
3 of Table VI, where we use the sum of all information events as the left-hand side 
variable, the coefficient on the number of opportunistic trades is positive (=0.03) 
and significant (t=2.78), while this same coefficient for routine trades is 
insignificant.  To get an idea of the magnitude of this effect, a one-standard 
deviation increase in the number of opportunistic trades translates into 1.0 more 
total information events in the following month for the firm; the average number of 
total information events per firm per month is 4.8 (median=5), so this effect 
implies a percentage increase of around 20% in the number of important events 
following these opportunistic trades. 
Looking specifically at firm news, Columns 4-6 show that opportunistic 
insider trades are strongly predictive of future headline news events.  The 
coefficient on opportunistic trades in Column 6 (=0.03, t=3.26) implies that for a 
one-standard deviation move in the number of opportunistic trades, the firm 
experiences 1.0 more headline news events next month relative to an average of 3.3 
events per month (median=3); in percentage terms this translates to a 32% to 35% 
increase in the number of headline news events.  Finally, in the Appendix Table 
A5 we show that if we split the number of opportunistic insider trades into the 
number of opportunistic buys and sells separately, both variables predict future 
news.  In fact, Column 6 of Table A5 indicates that opportunistic sells have 
somewhat more predictive power for future news than opportunistic buys, although 
both are significant predictors of future news.  This provides additional evidence on Decoding Inside Information — Page 23 
 
the power of our classification scheme to identify informative insider sells in 
particular, in contrast to much of the literature.   
Next we explore the behavior of opportunistic traders in the wake of news 
about illegal insider trading litigation cases.  Since opportunistic trades predict 
future firm-level returns, as well as future firm-level news, it is plausible that 
opportunistic traders might be especially sensitive to the potential costs and 
penalties associated with illegal insider trading.  We test this idea by regressing the 
fraction of insiders trading in a given month who are opportunistic on recent SEC 
releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider trading. Specifically, the 
dependent variable we examine is the number of opportunistic insiders trading in 
month t+1 divided by the number of all insiders trading in month t+1, and the 
independent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
SEC releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider activity in month t.  
We also include control variables for the fraction of opportunistic insiders trading 
in month t and month t-1, the CRSP value-weight market return in month t, the 
standard deviation of daily market returns in month t, and various windows of 
past cumulative market returns (month t-3 to t-1, month t-6 to t-1, and month t-
12 to t-1). 
Table VII illustrates that opportunistic trading decreases significantly 
following recent releases from the SEC regarding illegal insider trading cases, 
consistent with the idea that opportunistic traders dampen their trading activity 
when the potential costs of illegal trading increase.  Specifically, the  coefficient on 
the number of SEC releases in Column 7 is -0.015 (t=2.41).  
Finally, we explore our results in even greater depth by analyzing which types Decoding Inside Information — Page 24 
 
of opportunistic insiders are especially informed about future news events.  We 
explore this idea in Table VIII by adding a series of additional explanatory 
variables to the specifications we employ in Columns 1-3 of Table VI, where we use 
the total number of information events as our dependent variable.  Specifically, in 
addition to the number of opportunistic trades, we add independent variables equal 
to: a) the number of opportunistic trades by local insiders (where local is defined 
as residing in the same state as the firm’s corporate headquarters), b) the number 
of opportunistic trades by senior insiders (where senior is defined as either the 
CEO, CFO, or Chairman of the Board), c) the number of opportunistic trades by 
inside/non-independent directors,
19 and d) the number of opportunistic trades by 
outside/independent directors (where independent directors are identified using the 
“role-code” variable in the Thomson database).
20 
Table VIII provides modest evidence consistent with the idea that informed 
opportunistic insiders trade more before information events than other 
opportunistic insiders.  Specifically, the first column of Table VIII indicates that 
the number of opportunistic trades by local insiders is positively related to the 
total number of firm-level information events in the following month.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient in Column 1 (=0.03, t=2.85) implies that for a one-
standard deviation move in the number of opportunistic trades by locals, the firm 
experiences 1.0 additional information events next month (so a roughly 20% 
increase, with an average of 4.8 and median of 5).  By contrast, comparing these to 
                                                 
19 Note that not all insiders are necessarily directors.  The class of insiders includes non-directors, 
inside directors, and outside directors. 
20 We have also examined the characteristics of opportunistic versus routine traders in a logit 
framework.  Their characteristics are, by and large, remarkably similar; e.g., the percentage of 
insiders that are local, independent, or senior, are not reliably different across the two groups.  Decoding Inside Information — Page 25 
 
the opportunistic trades of the other classes of insiders in Columns 2-4, and 
especially in the full specification of Column 5, we find no significant difference in 
the explanatory power between the opportunistic trades of independent directors, 
senior insiders, or inside directors.  Given the evidence in Ravina and Sapienza 
(2009) that the difference in the profitability of insider trades by executives 




In this section we perform a series of additional tests in order to evaluate the 
robustness of our findings.  The goal is to verify that our results are not 
concentrated in certain types of stocks, or at certain specific times.  To do so, we 
examine a variety of subsamples, such as large stocks versus small stocks, stocks 
heavily-traded by insiders versus stocks lightly-traded by insiders, and finally 
trades made only during specific times (such as inside or outside explicit 
“blackout” windows).   
Table IX presents tests for these various subsamples. The regressions are 
performed identically to Table III, where future one-month returns are regressed on 
the dummy variables Opportunistic Buy, Routine Buy, Opportunistic Sell, and 
Routine Sell, plus a series of control variables.  Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) include 
only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the market capitalization distribution, 
where market cap is measured in December of the prior year.  These results show 
that opportunistic trades (both buys and sells) predict returns for both large stocks Decoding Inside Information — Page 26 
 
and small stocks, while routine trades (both buys and sells) are uninformative for 
both large and small stocks.       
Next we explore if insider trading intensity (see Seyhun (1998) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001)) is related to our findings.  Specifically, Columns 5 and 
6 (7 and 8) include only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the distribution of 
fraction of shares outstanding traded by insiders in the prior year.  Again we find 
that both opportunistic buys and sells are strongly predictive of future returns for 
both high- and low-intensity stocks.  Meanwhile, routine sells do not predict future 
returns for high- or low-intensity stocks.  Routine buys exhibit marginal 
predictability, but only for high-intensity stocks, and with only roughly a third the 
magnitude of the opportunistic buys.     
Finally, we explore if our results are concentrated inside (or outside) explicit 
“blackout” windows.  Blackout windows are times during which insiders are 
allegedly prohibited from trading in their company’s stock.  Although these 
windows vary by firm (see Bettis, Coles, and Lemon (2000)), many firms explicitly 
allow insider trading solely during the month following a quarterly earnings 
announcement (e.g., trading days +3 to +24 after an earnings release).  Note that 
in our data we do observe frequent trading outside this post-earnings (+3 to +24 
day) trading window for many firms, but this stringent window is a time during 
which insider trading is unambiguously permitted by many firms. Hence, exploring 
the behavior of opportunistic versus routine traders inside and outside this window 
allows us to assess the impact (if any) of blackout windows on our findings.
21 
                                                 
21 We have experimented with a variety of other definitions for blackout windows, and the results 
are similar to those presented here. Decoding Inside Information — Page 27 
 
Columns 9 and 10 include only those trades that are unambiguously 
permitted, i.e., trades made within the post-earnings (+3 to +24) trading window, 
while also excluding any trades that occur up to 30 days before an M&A 
announcement; Columns 11 and 12 explore the remaining “blackout window” 
trades.  We find that during both blackout and non-blackout periods, opportunistic 
buys (and sells) are strong predictors of future returns.  In contrast, routine trades 
(buys and sells) have no predictive power for future returns during either blackout 
or non-blackout periods.    
Overall, the results in Table IX indicate that opportunistic trades are much 
more informative than routine trades for a variety of subsamples: large stocks, 
small stocks, heavily-traded stocks, lightly-traded stocks, and inside and outside 
pre-defined blackout windows.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we employ a simple empirical strategy to decode the information 
in insider trades.  Our analysis rests on the basic premise that insiders, while 
possessing private information, trade for many reasons, and that by identifying ex-
ante those trades that are routine (and hence uninformative), one can better 
isolate the true information that insiders contain about the future of firms.  Using 
simple definitions of routine trades, we are able to systematically and predictably 
identify insiders as either opportunistic or routine traders throughout our sample.  
We show that stripping away the uninformative signals of routine traders leaves a 
set of information-rich opportunistic trades that are powerful predictors of future Decoding Inside Information — Page 28 
 
firm returns, news, and events.  An advantage of our approach is that it weeds out 
roughly half the universe of insider trades, and specifically the half that has no 
predictive power for future returns or firm news.  Meanwhile the half that remains 
contains all the predictive power in the insider trading universe.   
We show that while the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are 
essentially zero, a portfolio strategy that instead focuses solely on opportunistic 
insider trades yields value-weight (equal-weight) abnormal returns of 82 basis 
points per month (180 basis points per month).  Similarly, in a regression context 
the combined differences in the coefficients between opportunistic trades and 
routine trades translate into an increase of 158 basis points per month in the 
predictive ability of opportunistic trades relative to routine trades.  Further, this 
effect increases with the strength of the opportunistic signal: the more 
opportunistic buys (sells) there are on a given firm, the more pronounced are the 
positive (negative) future returns.  By contrast, we find no relation between the 
number of routine trades and future returns.   
    In exploring the mechanism at work behind our identification and return 
results, we demonstrate that trades by opportunistic insiders predict future firm 
news and future firm events, while trades by routine insiders do not.  Further, we 
find that opportunistic traders decrease their trading activity in the wake of 
increases in the number of news releases by the SEC regarding illegal insider 
trading cases, consistent with the idea that opportunistic traders are sensitive to 
the potential costs of illegal insider trading.  Finally, we find evidence that some 
classes of opportunistic insiders that we might expect to be more informed ex-ante 
(such as local insiders) have trades that are especially informative for future Decoding Inside Information — Page 29 
 
information events.   
Collectively our results suggest that it is possible to identify, out of the tens 
of thousands of insider trades made each year, which trades are truly informative.  
More generally, decoding the true information in other activities in the market, 
such as the trades made by banks or institutional investors, would help price 
setters, market regulators, and all active participants in securities markets develop 
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 Figure 1: Moonburst Example 
 
Below are a table and figures for the Moonburst firm from our sample.  The table contains Opportunistic 
and Routine insider sell trades over a period of two and a half years, and also the returns in the months 
following the trades.  Also contained in the table are full-sample averages of returns following 
Opportunistic and Routine insider trade sales, and the average number of news events in the months 
following Opportunistic and Routine sales.  The accompanying graphs show the full-sample average of 
returns to insider sells and news following insider sell trades.  The firm’s name and trade dates have been 
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Jan-94  1  12.2%
Feb-94  1  4.5%
Mar-94  1  -13.2%
Apr-94  1  2.0%
May-94  1  1  -11.9%
Jun-94  1  14.1%
Jul-94  1  8.6%
Aug-94  1  -9.8%
Sep-94  1  0.3%
Oct-94  1  -0.8%
Nov-94  1  8.5%
Dec-94  1  12.7%
Jan-95  1  7.9%
Feb-95  1  -1.1%
Mar-95  1  3.4%
Apr-95  1  2.5%
May-95  1  5.4%
Jun-95  1  1.8%
Jul-95  1  3.5%
Aug-95  1  -1.8%
Sep-95  1  12.1%
Oct-95  1  12.4%
Nov-95  1  -3.1%
Dec-95  1  3.3%
Jan-96  1  0.9%
Feb-96  1  7.8%
Mar-96  1  -2.4%
Apr-96  1  9.9%
May-96  1  -4.5%
Jun-96  1  1  -10.0%
  
Avg Ret Following Routine Sells  2.5%
Avg Ret Following Opportunistic Sells -10.9%
   
   
Full Sample for Moonburst
Avg Ret Following Routine Sells  2.2%
Avg Ret Following Opportunistic Sells -11.8%
 
Avg News Following Routine Sells  2.71
Avg News Following Opportunistic Sells 5.67Figure 2: Size distribution 
 
This figure plots the distribution of market capitalization of the opportunistic and routine trade sample. 
Every calendar month we assign stocks to size deciles using NYSE breakpoint. We plot the % of stocks in 





























D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
All CRSP Stocks Stocks with opportunistic trades Stocks with routine tradesFigure 3: Returns to Opportunistic Trades, Event-time Returns 
 
This figure shows the event-time returns to portfolios that follow the trades of opportunistic and routine insiders from 1989 to 2007. Opportunistic 
trades are defined as in Table I, as are routine trades.  This figure presents the difference in performance following opportunistic versus routine 
buys (dashed line), opportunistic versus routine sells (dotted line), and of the buy-sell, opportunistic-routine spread portfolio (solid line), over 12 
months following portfolio formation.  
 
 










0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Equal-weight portfolios
Opportunistic minus Routine (Buys - Sells)
Opportunistic (Buys - Sells)









0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Value-weight portfolios
Opportunistic minus Routine (Buys - Sells)
Opportunistic (Buys - Sells)
Routine (Buys - Sells)Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents an overview of the sample we use in this paper, for which we can define programs 
(Opportunistic Universe), compared to the entire TFN Insiders database (Insider Universe), between 1989 
and 2007. Each year, the opportunistic universe is that universe of insiders who have at least one trade in 
each of the preceding 3 years (so that routine traders and opportunistic traders can be defined). Panel A 
presents firm-level characteristics, with all numbers being full sample averages (medians), except for # of 
unique companies, which is the total number of unique companies over the entire sample period.  Size is 
defined as the market capitalization of the firm in millions of dollars.  Book-to-markets that are negative, 
or greater than 100 (likely mistakes in the data) are excluded from the data. Panel B presents insider-
level characteristics for both the Opportunistic Universe and the Insider Universe. Trades over the last 
three years are used to characterize insiders as either routine or opportunistic traders. All subsequent 
trades that are made after we classify each insider as either routine or opportunistic are then placed into 
one of two buckets: a) “routine trades” (i.e., all trades made by routine traders), and b “opportunistic 

































Panel A: Firm-Level Characteristics 
  Opportunistic Universe Insider Universe 
  Average  Median Average Median 
Size  3274 330 1604 117
Size percentile  63.95% 69.57% 52.38% 53.93%
Book-to-market  0.66 0.47 0.84 0.55
Book-to-market percentile  42.52% 39.18% 47.47% 45.43%
# buys/ company  21.10 2 31.45 15 
# sells/ company  68.89 6 59.17 20 
# of unique companies  5493 15276   
Panel B: Insider-Level Characteristics 
  Opportunistic Universe Insider Universe 
  Average  Median Average Median 
# buys/ insider  4.79 0 2.35 1 
Buy trade size (bps)  16.62 1.94 14.93 1.61
% all buys that are routine  64.44%   
% all buys that are opportunistic  35.56%   
# sells/ insider  8.24 1 4.06 1 
Sell trade size (bps)  13.15 3.00 25.59 3.72
% all sells that are routine  52.02%   
% all sells that are opportunistic  47.98%   
# companies/ insider  2.23 2 2.29 2 
    
% all trades that are routine  54.81%   
% all trades that are opportunistic  45.19%   Table II: Correlation Between Routine and Opportunistic trades, 1989—2007 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients are calculated over all months and over all available stocks for the following variables. # Opportunistic Buys is the 
number of opportunistic buys for the given firm and month, and # Routine Buys is the number of routine buys in the given firm in the given 
month.  These variables are defined analogously for sells.  Log(Size) is the log of market capitalization as of the end of the previous calendar 
month. Log(B/M) the log of the book-market ratio, which is the market value of equity divided by Compustat book value of equity. The timing of 
B/M follows Fama and French (1993) and is as of the previous December year-end. RET is the return in the prior 12 months before the month of 










Sells Log(Size) Log(B/M) RET
# Opportunistic Buys  1 -0.001 -0.029 -0.016 -0.079 0.066 -0.024
# Routine Buys  1 -0.017 -0.008 -0.039 0.011 0.002
# Opportunistic Sells  1 0.001 0.101 -0.059 0.015
# Routine Sells  1 0.111 -0.091 0.005
Log(Size)  1 -0.436 0.122

















 Table III: Performance of Routine and Opportunistic Trades 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month.  The dependent variable in 
each is future one-month returns (RET).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  Opportunistic Buy is a categorical variable 
equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable 
equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are 
defined equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market equity and book-to-market of 
the given firm.  Past Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior sixth month period.  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where 
indicated.  Standard errors clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are 
indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 








































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Opportunistic Buy  1.45***  1.02***  0.90***        0.68***  0.65***  0.57** 
  (8.22)  (5.24)  (4.64)        (2.80)  (2.60)  (2.30) 
Routine Buy  0.87*** 0.30*  0.14        0.09  -0.08  -0.20 
     
(5.54) (1.73)  (0.81)        (0.37)  (-0.32) (-0.84) 
Opportunistic Sell        -1.44***  -0.95***  -0.78***  -1.14***  -0.75***  -0.67*** 
            (-11.11)  (-6.65)  (-5.67)  (-5.69)  (-3.64)  (-3.37) 
Routine Sell       -0.58*** -0.02  0.04  -0.30  0.16  0.14 
           (-4.19) (-0.13)  (0.24)  (-1.49) (0.77)  (0.69) 
Size    -0.22*** -0.20***   -0.23*** -0.20***   -0.22*** -0.20*** 
        (-5.19) (-4.55)    (-5.38) (-4.70)    (-5.20)  (-4.56) 
BM    0.36*** 0.37***   0.37*** 0.38***   0.37*** 0.38*** 
        (3.13) (3.30)    (3.26) (3.42)    (3.23)  (3.40) 
Past Month Returns    -0.03*** -0.05***   -0.03*** -0.05***   -0.03*** -0.05*** 
        (-4.00) (-6.09)    (-3.93) (-6.03)    (-3.90)  (-6.01) 
Past Year Returns    0.005*** 0.01***    0.005*** 0.01***    0.01***  0.01*** 
        (3.68) (4.71)    (3.81) (4.80)    (3.82)  (4.79) 
Fixed Effect    Month Month Month
Number  of  observations  52444  48460 48460 52444 48460 48460 52444 48460 48460 Table IV: Portfolio Returns to Routine and Opportunistic Trades 
 
This table shows the returns to buy and sell portfolios that follow the routine and opportunistic trades in our opportunistic universe from 1989-
2007. Opportunistic and routine trades are defined as in Table I.  A firm is included in the opportunistic buy portfolio, for example, in month 
(t+1) if any of its insiders placed an opportunistic buy on the firm in month t.  At the end of the month (t+1), we rebalance the portfolios based 
on new insider trades. Below are the monthly returns to these opportunistic and routine buy and sell portfolios in percentages, shown for both 
equal and value weighting.  Panel A shows results for equal-weighted portfolios, while Panel B shows results for value-weighted portfolios.  t-
statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 














Average returns  2.33 1.65 0.68 0.77 1.41  -0.63 1.55 0.25
Standard dev.  4.95 4.06 3.03 5.97 6.01  2.64 4.91 4.67
CAPM  alpha  1.51***  0.92*** 0.59*** -0.30  0.32  -0.61***  1.81***  0.60** 
  (5.89)  (4.34) (2.98) (-1.31)  (1.44) (-3.47)  (5.86)  (2.25) 
Fama-French  alpha  1.20***  0.64*** 0.56*** -0.21  0.43*** -0.65***  1.41***  0.20 
  (5.49)  (3.78) (2.74) (-1.34)  (2.72) (-3.60)  (5.04)  (0.87) 
Carhart  alpha  1.45***  0.82*** 0.63*** -0.19  0.38**  -0.57***  1.64***  0.44* 
  (6.82)  (4.92) (3.03) (-1.18)  (2.32) (-3.11)  (5.86)  (1.89) 
DGTW  Char  Adj 1.24***  0.40**  0.83*** -0.27**  0.42*** -0.69***  1.51***  -0.02 
  (4.99)  (2.00) (3.39) (-2.09)  (2.75) (-4.52)  (4.98)  (-0.06) 
5-Factor  alpha  1.58***  0.87*** 0.70*** -0.23  0.45*** -0.67***  1.80***  0.43* 
  (7.03)  (5.00) (3.18) (-1.30)  (2.59) (-3.48)  (6.07)  (1.73) 













Average returns  1.79 1.27 0.52 0.72 1.00  -0.29 1.08 0.27
Standard dev.  5.96 5.02 5.27 5.70 6.16  2.92 5.88 5.97
CAPM alpha  0.87***  0.45*  0.42  -0.34*  -0.09  -0.25  1.22***  0.55 
  (2.88)  (1.73) (1.20) (-1.73)  (-0.39)  (-1.29)  (3.14)  (1.44) 
Fama-French  alpha  0.64**  0.18 0.46 -0.08 0.28 -0.36  0.72**  -0.09 
  (2.16)  (0.75) (1.27) (-0.46)  (1.35) (-1.83)  (2.06)  (-0.29) 
Carhart  alpha  0.52*  0.09 0.43 -0.09 0.17 -0.26  0.62*  -0.07 
  (1.73)  (0.37) (1.16) (-0.50)  (0.80) (-1.29)  (1.71)  (-0.22) 
DGTW  Char  Adj  0.57**  0.26 0.31 -0.18 0.06 -0.24  0.75**  0.21 
  (2.35)  (1.26) (1.04) (-1.29)  (0.31) (-1.46)  (2.48)  (0.72) 
5-Factor  alpha 0.72**  0.09 0.63 -0.10 0.29 -0.39*  0.82**  -0.20 
  (2.27)  (0.34) (1.61) (-0.49)  (1.32) (-1.84)  (2.15)  (-0.57)  
Table V: Impact of the Number of Routine and Opportunistic Trades  
 
This table reports panel regressions of returns on continuous measures of the number of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month. The 
dependent variable in each is future one-month returns (RET).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  Number of 
Opportunistic Buys is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of opportunistic buys in the given firm for the prior month (so is 
equal to zero if there were zero trades).  Number of Routine Buys is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of routine buys in the 
given firm for the prior month (so is equal to zero if there were zero trades).  Number of Opportunistic Sells and Number of Routine Sells are 
defined equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market equity and book-to-market of 
the given firm.  Past Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior sixth month period.  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where 
indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in 






  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of Opportunistic Buys  0.95***  0.74***  0.66***        0.67***  0.61***  0.59*** 
      (6.77)  (4.97)  (4.56)        (4.52)  (3.97)  (3.93) 
Number of Routine Buys  0.39***  0.10 0.01       0.14 -0.02  -0.05 
      (4.09)  (0.92)  (0.12)     (1.37)  (-0.16)  (-0.43) 
Number of Opportunistic Sells        -0.63***  -0.43***  -0.31***  -0.49***  -0.35***  -0.25*** 
            (-10.29)  (-6.75)  (-4.97)  (-7.36)  (-5.21)  (-3.70) 
Number of Routine Sells       -0.24***  0.01 0.07 -0.12*  0.07 0.12 
           (-3.64)  (0.17) (0.97) (-1.75)  (0.99) (1.64) 
Size    -0.24*** -0.20***   -0.24*** -0.22***   -0.22*** -0.20*** 
        (-5.43) (-4.71)   (-5.66) (-5.17)   (-5.18) (-4.71) 
BM    0.39*** 0.39***   0.40*** 0.42***   0.38*** 0.39*** 
        (3.39) (3.52)   (3.49) (3.69)   (3.31) (3.51) 
Past Month Returns    -0.03*** -0.05***   -0.03*** -0.05***   -0.03*** -0.05*** 
        (-4.05) (-6.14)   (-4.00) (-6.10)   (-3.92) (-6.04) 
Past Year Returns    0.00*** 0.01***   0.00*** 0.01***   0.01*** 0.01*** 
        (3.67) (4.71)   (3.73) (4.75)   (3.82) (4.79) 
Fixed Effect  Month Month Month
Number  of  observations  52444  48460 48460 52444 48460 48460 52444 48460 48460  
Table VI: Opportunistic Trades and the Arrival of Information 
 
This table reports panel regressions of information events on the number of routine and opportunistic trades in a company in the prior month. The 
dependent variables in the regressions are: in Columns 1-3, a proxy for firm information environment using the number of news, annual and 
quarterly earnings forecast revisions, recommendation changes, SEO and M&A activities (All Firm Info), in Columns 4-6, solely the number of 
news (News).   The main independent variables of interest are the Number of Opportunistic Trades and the Number of Routine Trades, defined as 
in Table V. Lag 1 Month News is equal to the number of information events (for each respective specification of information events) observed for 
the given firm in the prior month, while Lag 6 Month News is defined equivalently for information events of the firm in the 6 months prior to last 
month.  Past Month Returns and Past 6 Month Returns are defined equivalently for returns, while Size is described in Table II.  Month fixed 
effects (Month) are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered 


























  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Type of Information:  All Firm Info All Firm Info All Firm Info News News News
Number of Opportunistic Trades 0.20***  0.03***  0.03***  0.21***  0.03***  0.03*** 
     
(5.77)  (2.72)  (2.78)  (5.69)  (2.90)  (3.26) 
Number of Routine Trades  0.12*** -0.00  0.02  0.12***  0.01  0.01 
     
(3.11) (-0.11)  (1.33) (2.88)  (0.46)  (1.04) 
Size    0.10*** 0.03***   0.03***  0.02*** 
        (16.49) (8.01)    (5.28)  (4.96) 
BM    -0.04*** -0.01    -0.03***  -0.01 
        (-3.16) (-1.58)   (-3.51)  (-1.46) 
Past Month Returns    -0.00* 0.00***    -0.00  0.00*** 
        (-1.76) (2.86)    (-0.78)  (3.98) 
Past Year Returns    0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
         (0.75) (1.15)   (1.42)  (1.13) 
Past Month News    0.58*** 0.22***   0.73***  0.28*** 
    (38.68) (19.33)   (54.36)  (18.83) 
Past 6 Month News     0.46***      0.39*** 
          (54.89)      (65.79) 
Fixed Effect  Month Month  Month Month
Number  of  observations  22071 20198 20198 22071  20198  20198 Table VII: SEC Activity and Opportunistic Trading 
 
This table reports regressions of the fraction of insiders trading in a given month who are opportunistic on 
recent SEC releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider trading.  The dependent variable is 
the number of opportunistic insiders trading in month t+1 divided by the number of all insiders trading 
in month t+1.  The independent variable of interest is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of SEC releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider activity in month t.  We also 
include control variables for the fraction of opportunistic insiders trading in month t and month t-1, the 
CRSP value-weight market return in month t, the standard deviation of daily market returns in month t, 
and various windows of past cumulative market returns (month t-3 to t-1, month t-6 to t-1, and month t-
12 to t-1).  t-stats based on robust standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Num SEC Releasest   -0.019***  -0.012**  -0.013**  -0.014**  -0.014**  -0.014**  -0.015** 
      (-2.65)  (-1.99)  (-2.17)  (-2.26)  (-2.24)  (-2.35)  (-2.41) 
Fraction Insiderst    0.588*** 0.390*** 0.357*** 0.352*** 0.323*** 0.249*** 
        (8.77) (4.77) (4.21) (4.15) (3.84) (3.00) 
Fraction Insiderst-1      0.336*** 0.352*** 0.347*** 0.320*** 0.241*** 
          (4.59) (4.90) (4.74) (4.28) (3.07) 
Market Returnt     0.182**  0.158  0.132  0.089 
         (2.04)  (1.39)  (1.34)  (0.95) 
StdMarketRett     0.192  0.382  0.761  1.384 
         (0.21)  (0.38)  (0.73)  (1.44) 
Market Returnt-3,t-1      0 . 0 3 3     
           (-0.48)    
Market Returnt-6,t-1       0 . 0 7 9 *    
       ( 1 . 6 7 )    
Market Returnt-12,t-1        0.116*** 
             ( 3 . 7 6 )  
Number of 
observations  147 147 147 146 146 146 146 Table VIII: Which Opportunistic Traders Are the Most Informed? 
 
This table reports panel regressions of information events on the number of opportunistic trades by 
various insider types in a company in the prior month. The dependent variable in the regressions is a 
proxy for the firm information environment using the number of news, annual and quarterly earnings 
forecast revisions, recommendation changes, SEO and M&A activities.  The main independent variables of 
interest are the Number of Opportunistic Trades, as defined in Table VI, for various types of insiders.  
The types of insiders we consider are: Local Insiders (defined as insiders that reside in the same state as 
their firm’s headquarters), Senior Officers of the firm (defined as CEO, CFO, or Chairman of the Board), 
Inside Directors, and Independent Directors of the firm.  Lag 1 and Lag 6 Month News are defined as in 
Table IV.  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opportunistic Trades by Local Insiders  0.03***    0.03** 
     
(2.85)     (2.22) 
Opportunistic Trades by Independent Directors  0.02    0.01 
 
 (1.50)    (0.41) 
Opportunistic Trades by Senior Insiders     0.01   0.00 
     
  (0.96)   (-0.11) 
Opportunistic Trades by Inside Directors     0.01  0.01 
     
   (0.60)  (0.52) 
Trades by Routine Insiders  0.01 -0.00  0.01 0.00 0.01 
     
(0.93) (-0.04)  (0.53) (0.39) (0.51) 
Size  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
     
(7.92) (7.03) (7.93) (7.93) (7.01) 
BM  -0.01* -0.02* -0.01* -0.01* -0.02* 
     
(-1.71) (-1.90) (-1.79) (-1.83) (-1.74) 
Past Month Returns  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
     
(2.93) (2.69) (3.06) (3.09) (2.50) 
Past Year Returns  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
(1.12) (1.08) (1.18) (1.20) (1.02) 
Past Month News  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
      
(19.21) (15.63) (19.08) (19.10) (15.77) 
Past 6 Month News  0.46*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.49***
     
(54.90) (36.40) (54.77) (54.78) (36.58) 
Fixed Effect  Month Month Month Month Month
Number  of  observations  20198 12221 20198 20198 12221 Table IX: Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month.  The dependent variable in 
each is future one-month returns (RET).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  Opportunistic Buy is a categorical variable 
equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable 
equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are 
defined equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of market equity and book-to-market of the given firm.  Columns 1 
and 2 (3 and 4) include only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the market capitalization distribution, where market cap is measured in December 
of the prior year.  Columns 5 and 6 (7 and 8) include only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the distribution of fraction of shares outstanding 
traded by insiders in the prior year.  Columns 9 and 10 (11 and 12) include only those trades made within (outside) a 21-day trading window (+3 
to +24 days) after an earnings announcement, while also excluding (including) any trades that occur up to 30 days before an M&A announcement.  
Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated.  Standard errors clustered at the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the estimates, 
and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 




Non-Blackout Only Blackout Only 
Opportunistic Buy  0.55**    0.80*** 1.27*** 0.56**  1.28*** 0.85***
  (2.31)    (2.78)    (4.14)    (2.36)    (3.81)    (3.69)   
Routine Buy  0.08   -0.01 0.46* -0.17  0.34 0.14
      (0.37)   (-0.05)   (1.69)   (-0.80)   (1.25)   (0.70)   
Opportunistic Sell    -0.55***  -0.83*** -1.13***   -0.39** -0.99*** -0.78*** 
        (-3.44)    (-3.29)    (-5.45)    (-2.13)    (-4.43)    (-4.65) 
Routine Sell   0.11  0.11 -0.03  0.07 -0.21 0.08
       (0.62)   (0.37)   (-0.14)   (0.36)   (-0.90)   (0.45) 
Size  -0.08 -0.08 -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.11 -0.11* -0.22*** -0.23*** 
      (-1.34) (-1.43) (-3.54) (-3.50) (-3.10) (-3.28) (-2.73) (-2.78) (-1.57) (-1.72) (-4.27) (-4.43) 
BM  0.40*** 0.43*** 0.23 0.22 0.34** 0.37** 0.39**  0.39** 0.37* 0.39** 0.40*** 0.42*** 
      (3.06) (3.27) (1.26) (1.18) (2.14) (2.33) (2.44) (2.41) (1.94) (2.04) (3.10) (3.22) 
Past Month Returns  -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
      (-2.87) (-2.77) (-5.62) (-5.61) (-4.45) (-4.38) (-4.46) (-4.43) (-2.84) (-2.81) (-6.60) (-6.57) 
Past Year Returns  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01  0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
      (4.98) (5.06) (2.21) (2.30) (4.69) (4.81) (1.39) (1.41) (2.63) (2.65) (3.35) (3.42) 
Fixed  Effect  Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month 




















 Table A1: Portfolio Returns to Insider Trades, Young Versus Old Companies 
 
This table shows the returns to insider buys and insider sells in young companies (those insider trades that are made within three years of the 
company’s first appearance in CRSP) and old companies (those insider trades that are made three or more years after the company’s first 
appearance in CRSP). A firm is included in the buy (sell) portfolio in month (t+1) if any of its insiders bought (sold) on the firm in month t.  At 
the end of the month (t+1), we rebalance the portfolios based on new insider trades. Below are the monthly returns to and alphas on these buy 
and sell portfolios, in percentages, shown for both equal (in Panel A) and value weighting (in Panel B).  t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 











 Young  Companies  Old  Companies  Young Minus Old 
Panel A: Equal weights  Buys  Sells  Buys-Sells Buys  Sells Buys-Sells  Buys  Sells  Buys-Sells 
Average  returns  1.73 0.56  1.17  1.95 0.75  1.20  -0.21  -0.18  -0.03 
Standard  dev.  6.55 8.07  3.45  5.27 5.34  2.27  2.94  4.11  3.02 
CAPM  alpha  0.91*** -0.38 1.29***  1.20*** -0.04  1.24***  -0.29  -0.34  0.05 
  (3.62) (-1.28)  (6.70)  (6.37) (-0.28) (9.22)  (-1.68)  (-1.48)  (0.28) 
Fama-French  alpha  0.95*** -0.19 1.14  1.04*** -0.11  1.15***  -0.09  -0.08  -0.01 
  (4.61) (-1.04)  (6.82)  (7.34) (-1.51) (8.92)  (-0.64)  (-0.45)  (-0.09) 
Carhart  alpha  1.28*** 0.05  1.22***  1.31*** -0.10  1.41***  -0.03  0.15  -0.19 
  (6.70) (0.31)  (7.22)  (10.45)  (-1.36) (12.74)  (-0.22)  (0.89)  (-1.14) 
 Young  Companies  Old  Companies  Young Minus Old 
Panel B: Value weights  Buys  Sells  Buys-Sells Buys  Sells Buys-Sells  Buys  Sells  Buys-Sells 
Average  returns  0.96 0.74  0.22  1.07 0.64  0.42  -0.11  0.10  -0.21 
Standard  dev.  6.67 8.53  4.47  4.95 4.77  2.25  4.58  5.63  4.64 
CAPM alpha  0.10  -0.25  0.34  0.29***  -0.14**  0.43***  -0.20  -0.11  -0.09 
  (0.43) (-0.81)  (1.33)  (2.55) (-2.35) (3.18)  (-0.73)  (-0.34)  (-0.34) 
Fama-French alpha  0.22  0.05  0.17  0.23**  -0.11*  0.33**  0.00  0.16  -0.16 
  (1.13) (0.22)  (0.73)  (2.03) (-1.87) (2.56)  (-0.01)  (0.68)  (-0.60) 
Carhart alpha  0.21  -0.04  0.26  0.35***  -0.15***  0.50***  -0.14  0.11  -0.24 
  (1.05) (-0.19)  (1.04)  (3.20) (-2.59) (3.97)  (-0.58)  (0.46)  (-0.90)  
Table A2: Portfolio Returns to Insider Trades, Young Versus Old Insiders 
 
This table shows the returns to buys and sells of young insiders (those insider trades that are made within three years of a given insider’s first 
trade in the database) and of old insiders (those insider trades that are made three or more years after a given insider’s first trade in the 
database). A firm is included in the buy (sell) portfolio in month (t+1) if any of its insiders bought (sold) on the firm in month t.  At the end of 
the month (t+1), we rebalance the portfolios based on new insider trades. Below are the monthly returns to and alphas on these buy and sell 
portfolios, in percentages, shown for both equal (in Panel A) and value weighting (in Panel B).  t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, 5%, 










  Young Insiders  Old Insiders  Young Minus Old 
Panel A: Equal weights  Buys  Sells  Buys-Sells Buys  Sells Buys-Sells  Buys  Sells  Buys-Sells 
Average  returns  1.95 0.65  1.30  1.98 0.83  1.14  0.00  -0.18  0.17 
Standard  dev.  5.70 6.18  2.59  5.53 5.44  3.22  2.15  1.84  2.08 
CAPM  alpha  1.17*** -0.20  1.36***  1.26*** 0.09  1.19***  -0.02  -0.22*  0.18 
  (5.67) (-1.04)  (9.11)  (5.24) (0.51)  (5.80)  (-0.15)  (-1.89)  (1.33) 
Fama-French  alpha  1.08*** -0.15  1.23***  1.08*** 0.02  1.08***  0.03  -0.15  0.16 
  (6.78) (-1.73)  (9.17)  (5.37) (0.22)  (5.48)  (0.24)  (-1.43)  (1.19) 
Carhart  alpha  1.38*** -0.10  1.48***  1.46*** 0.02  1.47***  0.03  -0.08  0.10 
  (9.93) (-1.14)  (12.64)  (8.07) (0.17)  (8.36)  (0.20)  (-0.79)  (0.72) 
  Young Insiders  Old Insiders  Young Minus Old 
Panel B: Value weights  Buys  Sells  Buys-Sells Buys  Sells Buys-Sells  Buys  Sells  Buys-Sells 
Average  returns  1.09 0.58  0.52  1.09 0.70  0.32  -0.02  -0.18  0.21 
Standard  dev.  5.21 5.04  2.79  4.94 4.72  3.15  2.87  1.43  3.09 
CAPM  alpha  0.30** -0.22** 0.52***  0.37** -0.02  0.35  -0.04  -0.17  0.18 
  (2.38) (-2.45)  (3.09)  (2.20) (-0.28)  (1.73)  (-0.25)  (-1.87)  (0.89) 
Fama-French alpha  0.26**  -0.13  0.39**  0.31*  0.03  0.23  -0.02  -0.15  0.17 
  (2.07) (-1.63)  (2.43)  (1.86) (0.38)  (1.22)  (-0.13)  (-1.61)  (0.84) 
Carhart  alpha  0.40*** -0.23*** 0.64***  0.49*** -0.04 0.49***  -0.03  -0.19  0.22 
  (3.25) (-3.07)  (4.22)  (3.03) (-0.49)  (2.64)  (-0.18)  (-2.11)  (1.05) Table A3: Performance of Routine and Opportunistic Trades,  
Trade-Level Classification 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior 
month.  The dependent variable in each is future one-month returns in month t+1 (RET). To define routine 
trades, we investigate insiders’ trading patterns in the three preceding years. If an insider traded a stock in 
the same calendar month in three consecutive years, all trades he or she made subsequently in the same 
month are labeled as routine and trades made in a different month are labeled opportunistic. If an insider 
traded in three consecutive years, but no trades were made in the same month in these three years, all 
subsequent trades of that insider are labeled as opportunistic as well. Opportunistic Buy is a categorical 
variable equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month (month t), and 
zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given 
firm in the prior month (month t), and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are defined 
equivalently for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market 
equity and book-to-market of the given firm.  Past Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior 
sixth month period.  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated.  Standard errors clustered at 
the firm level.  t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are 













  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Opportunistic Buys  1.29***  0.77***  0.65***       
  (8.01)  (4.39)  (3.79)       
Routine Buys  -0.44**  -0.21  -0.29       
      (-2.48)  (-1.14)  (-1.57)       
Opportunistic Sells        -1.33***  -0.77***  -0.63*** 
        (-8.70)  (-4.66)  (-3.84) 
Routine Sells        0.53***  0.44***  0.31** 
            (3.77)  (3.06)  (2.29) 
Size    -0.23*** -0.20***   -0.24*** -0.21*** 
        (-5.50) (-4.76)   (-5.60) (-4.83) 
BM    0.38*** 0.38***   0.39*** 0.39*** 
        (3.35) (3.47) (3.42) (3.52)
Past Month Returns    -0.03*** -0.05***   -0.03*** -0.05*** 
        (-4.28) (-6.31) (-4.30) (-6.33)
Past Year Returns    0.00*** 0.01***   0.00*** 0.01*** 
        (3.69) (4.72) (3.70) (4.72)
Fixed Effect    Month Month
Number  of  observations 52444  48460 48460 52444 48460 48460 Table A4: Performance of Routine and Opportunistic Trades,  
Waiting Until 11th Day of Following Month 
 
This table reports pooled regressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior 
month.  The dependent variable in each is future one-month returns, computed from the 11
th day of the 
month subsequent to when insiders trade (i.e., month t+1) to the 10
th day of the following month (i.e., month 
t+2).  Routine and opportunistic trades are defined as in Table I.  Opportunistic Buy is a categorical variable 
equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month (month t), and zero 
otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given firm in 
the prior month (month t), and zero otherwise.  Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are defined equivalently 
for insider sales.  Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market equity and 
book-to-market of the given firm.  Past Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior sixth month 
period.  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated.  Standard errors clustered at the firm 
level.  t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated 
with ***,**, and *, respectively. 













































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Opportunistic Buy  1.43***  1.05***  1.00***       
  (7.86)  (5.39)  (5.26)       
Routine Buy  0.88*** 0.35**  0.20       
     
(6.07)  (2.20) (1.26)      
Opportunistic Sell        -1.46***  -1.04***  -0.90*** 
           
(-11.41)  (-7.45)  (-6.58) 
Routine Sell      -0.59***  -0.11  -0.12 
          
(-4.24) (-0.72) (-0.84) 
Size    -0.16*** -0.13***   -0.17*** -0.13*** 
       
(-4.19) (-3.34)   (-4.24) (-3.38) 
BM    0.44*** 0.40***   0.44*** 0.40*** 
       
(3.93) (3.70)   (3.97) (3.70) 
Past Month Returns   0.01  -0.01    0.01  -0.01 
       
(0.82) (-1.59)    (0.89) (-1.51) 
Past Year Returns   0.00  0.00**    0.00  0.00** 
        (0.64)  (2.06)    (0.76)  (2.15) 
Fixed Effect    Month Month
Number  of  observations  52444  48460 48460 52444 48460 48460 Table A5: Predicting News Events with Opportunistic Buys and Sells Separately 
 
This table reports panel regressions of information events on the number of routine and opportunistic buys 
and sells in a company in the prior month. The dependent variables in the regressions are: in Columns 1-3, a 
proxy for firm information environment in month t+1 using the number of news, annual and quarterly 
earnings forecast revisions, recommendation changes, SEO and M&A activities (All Firm Info), in Columns 4-
6, solely the number of news in month t+1 (News).   The main independent variables of interest are the 
Number of Opportunistic Buys, the Number of Opportunistic Sells, the Number of Routine Buys, and the 
Number of Routine Sells, each defined as the logarithm of one plus the number of trades of a given type, 
made in the prior month (month t). Lag 1 Month News is equal to the number of information events (for each 
respective specification of information events) observed for the given firm in the prior month (month t), while 
Lag 6 Month News is defined equivalently for information events of the firm in the 6 months prior to last 
month.  Past Month Returns and Past 6 Month Returns are defined equivalently for returns, while Size is 
described in Table II.  Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. All standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, 











  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)
Type of Information:  All Firm Info All Firm Info All Firm Info News News News
Number of Opportunistic Sells  0.26***  0.03** 0.03** 0.26***  0.03*** 0.04***
      (8.18)  (2.54)  (2.37)  (7.09)  (2.85)  (3.31) 
Number of Opportunistic Buys  -0.08**  0.02 0.03** 0.00  0.02*  0.02**
      (-2.49)  (1.58)  (2.40)  (0.13)  (1.69)  (2.01) 
Number of Routine Sells   0.31*** 0.03* 0.02 0.26***  0.02  0.02
      (6.63) (1.72) (1.58) (4.49)  (1.41)  (1.33) 
Number of Routine Buys  -0.11*** -0.04** 0.00 -0.05  -0.01  0.00
      (-3.17) (-2.29) (0.35)  (-1.50)  (-1.10)  (0.05) 
Size   0.09*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
        (15.87) (7.86)      (4.87)  (4.66) 
BM   -0.03** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.01
        (-2.42) (-1.37)     (-2.93)  (-1.01) 
Past Month Returns   -0.00** 0.00*** -0.00  0.00***
        (-2.02) (2.77)      (-0.97)  (3.76) 
Past Year Returns   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
         (0.44) (1.12)     (1.30)  (1.09) 
Past Month News   0.58*** 0.22*** 0.72*** 0.28***
    (39.76) (19.36)     (54.63)  (18.86) 
Past 6 Month News   0.46***     0.39***
         (19.36)        (65.62) 
Fixed Effect    Month Month Month  Month
Number of observations  22071  20198 20198 22071  20198  20198